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of the environmental contributions ,toward deviant behavior. It is entirely possible that we can, in the words of Montagu, "do a great deal
to change certain environmental conditions that may encourage
XYY individual to commit criminal acts."54
CONCLUSION

It is unlikely that the XYY Syndrome will win acceptance as a criminal defense in the near future. The judicial revolution which some
observers expected to follow the discovery of the XYY male, is not at
hand. At best, there has been a quiet acceptance in the scientific community of a correlation between presence of the defect, and anti-social
behavior.
Many years of study may lie ahead before the exact relationship between genetic abnormalities and behavior is uncovered. The birth to
death studies which some experts consider crucial could delay any real
understanding of the syndrome's behavioral manifestations for generations. And, the large scale population tests which are necessary to determine the true incidence of -theXYY are extremely costly.
However, it does seem clear at this point, that XYY individuals experience unusual difficulty in conforming their conduct to societal
norms. At some point the courts will be obligated to take notice of
this fact.
PAUL CHEVERIE

Agency and Licensing Problems In Reforming Group Credit
Insurance Contracts

When a consumer purchases merchandise. under a reta1 i-t~llrnpnt
contract or executes a promissory note for money loaned, he is usually
urged and sometimes required to purchase group credit insurance as
part of the transaction. Because the writer of -the policy retains a percentage of the premium as payment for placing the policy with the insurance company, salesmen and credit institutions often push the policy
upon the buyer. Credit institutions sometimes require credit insurance
coverage where the debtor is considered a poor credit risk. For example, a bank would require credit life insurance on an elderly person
who borrows money in order to be assured of repayment if the debtor
dies before the note is fully paid.
54. Montagu, supra note 1, at 49.
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GROUP CREDIT INSURANCE
In a typical transaction, the buyer is confronted by an automobile
salesman or loan officer, who does not hold an insurance license nor
possess any specialized insurance skills, discussing the merits of an insurance purchase. The consumer normally does not see the policy before
agreeing to buy the insurance and the provisions of the policy are not
adequately or accurately explained. It is especially true with salesmen
that the primary motive behind the insurance sales talk is the potential
profit to be made and not the consumer's protection or education.
There is never a choice of insurance companies available to the buyer
as he does not even know the name of the insurer until a copy of the
master policy arrives in the mail long after the purchase. It is easy
to see how the buyer often comes away from a credit insurance transaction believing that his insurance covers much more than the policy
provides. Variances between the oral sales representations and the
master policy provisions are discoverable after .the buyer receives his
copy. However, people seldom read their insurance policies..
If the group credit insurance contract does not conform to the oral
representations of the salesman or credit institution, rescission, reformation, and damages are the three remedies available to the buyer.
The expedient remedy is to cancel the credit insurance contract. Under § 25A-36 of the North Carolina General Statutes, the creditor is
required to refund the insurance premiums. Cancellation of the contract is a viable remedy if the insured has not suffered any damages
due to reliance upon false oral representations. An action on the contract is the appropriate remedy if the buyer has relied on misrepresentations as to coverage which resulted in his financial loss.
This paper concerns itself with agency and licensing problems which
prevent the reformation of group credit insurance contracts. It does
not explore any damage action remedies. Due to the governing case
law and statutory law, the consumer is at the mercy of salesmen and
creditors who may use sharp practices to coerce the purchase of group
credit insurance policies. In order to maintain an action for reformation of the group insurance policy, the salesman or creditor must be the
agent of the insurance company. When an agency relationship exists,
there is privity of contract between the insurer and the insured. An
action upon a personal insurance contract can easily be maintained because there is privity of contract between the buyer and the insurance
company. The personal insurance agent is required to be licensed and
an agency relationship exists between the insurance company and the
agent salesman. Such a relationship does not exist in group credit insurance, and the lack of licensing requirement is the heart of the problem.
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LICENSING REQUIREMENTS

Every insurance company which is authorized to do business in the
State of North Carolina must license their agents.' To obtain a license,
the agent must pass a written examination given by the insurance commissioner at such places and at such intervals "as he deems necessary
reasonably to serve the convenience of both the commissioner and the
applicants.' 2 The scope and depth of the examination, and the passing
standard are left to the discretion of the commissioner.3 With such
broad powers, the insurance commissioner has total discretion to determine the number of licensed insurance agents inthe state and the quality of those agents. However, the licensing power of the insurance
commissioner has not been extended over credit life insurance agents,
credit accident and health insurance agents, and credit property insurance agents. These agents have been specifically excluded from the
licensing requirements by the North Carolina Legislature. 4 People
who are credit life, accident and health, and property insurance agents
are not employees of insurance companies, but are in fact the local
banker, car salesman, and major appliance dealer. 5
The North Carolina General Statutes state:
Nothing contained in article 3 of Chapter 58 shall be construed as
prohibiting the purchase of insurance by, or requiring the licensing of,
a person who arranges the purchase of insurance to cover property in
which he or his employer has an interest, provided such insurance is
issued through an agent duly licensed under this article. 6
This provision authorizes the purchase of credit life, accident and
health, or property group policies by banking institutions, small loan offices, automobile dealerships, major appliance dealerships or any other
person or institution which has an insurable interest in property sold
to a consumer. An insurable interest, in practical terms, is a security
interest.7 The provision also exempts any employee of an institution,
which has purchased a group credit insurance policy and who arranges
the consumer's purchase of said insurance, from any licensing requirement.
Due to the fact that a credit life, accident and health, or property
insurance agent does not have to obtain a license, he is not subject to
the statutory penalties for willful misrepresentation of insurance poli.1. N.C.GEN.
2. N.C. GEN.

STAT.
STAT.

§ 58-40 (1972).
§ 58-41.1(d) (1969).

3.

STAT.

§ 58-41.1(a)(c) (1971).

N.C. GEN.

4. N.C.GEN.STAT. § 58-41.1(a)(6) (1971).
5. N.C.GEN. STAT. § 58-39.4(f)(j) (1971).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-40.5 (1953).
7. Rea v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 15 N.C. App. 620, 190 S.E.2d 708
(1972).
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GROUP CREDIT INSURANCE
cies, or deception as to the nature of the insurance contract itself.'
For any of the above violations, the penalties are civil in nature, and
authorize the insurance commissioner to revoke or suspend the agent's
It is clear that
license and inflict a maximum penalty of $25,000.00.
the insurance commissioner lacks the statutory authority to police any
abuses that the consumer suffers at the hands of those who arrange the
purchase of group credit insurance policies.
REFORMATION OF THE INSURANCE CONTRACT

By THE

COURTS

If the consumer is to obtain relief from sales abuses, his hope would
lie in the state courts of North Carolina. The remedy for willful misrepresentation of the insurance policy and deception as to the nature
of the insurance contract is the reformation of the contract to meet the
reasonable expectations of the consumer. North Carolina courts have
long held that insurance policies, like all written instruments, may be
reformed in equity by parol evidence. 10
Wex S. Malone surveyed the law regarding the reformation of contracts in his article published in the North Carolina Law Review." After an analysis of North Carolina case law, Malone found that the leading principles for reformation of a contract can be broadly stated as follows: 2
1) Reformation will not be granted except on clear and convincing
evidence.
2) Reformation will be granted only when the mistake is mutual.
3) Reformation will not be granted for a mistake of law standing
alone,
4) Reformation will not be granted for a mistake attributable to the
negligence of the complainant.
5) Reformation will not be granted when the complainant had a fair
opportunity to read the instrument before signing or accepting it.
By itself, mistake of law is inadequate for reformation of the insurance contract, but where such a mistake has been accompanied by inequitable conduct, reformation will be granted.' 3 Knowledge of the
intent of the parties is essential in ascertaining whether mutual mistake
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-42 (1913).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-44.6 (1955).

10. Britton v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 165 N.C. 149, 80 S.E. 1072 (1914);
Sykes v. Life Insurance Co. of Va., 148 N.C. 13, 61 S.E. 610 (1908); Williams v.

Greensboro Fire Insurance Co., 209 N.C. 765, 185 S.E. 21 (1936).
11. The Reformation of writings under the Law of North Carolina, 15 N.C.L. REV.
155 (1936).
12. Id. at 157.

13. M.P. Hubbard & Co. v. Home, 203 N.C. 205, 165 S.E. 347 (1932).
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or inequitable conduct has occurred, 4 and if reformation is to be granted, the misrepresentation must be a material one. 15
The courts of North Carolina recognized that mutual mistake is not
always essential to the reformation of a contract, but the mistake of one
party induced by the fraud of the other party is a good ground for reformation of an insurance policy.1 6 Insurance companies are liable for
misrepresentations of their agents as to policy provisions, especially
when such representations are made with the intention to induce acceptance of the policy.' 7 The insured is entitled to rely upon the apparent
authority of the agent and the insurance company will be liable for misrepresentations unless the limitations of the agent's authority are
brought to the attention of the insured. 18
If the disagreement between the parties concerns the interpretation
of the written contract, the provision must be construed against the insurer as the draftsman of the document.' 9
20
In North Carolina, an oral contract for insurance will be upheld.
However, once the contract is reduced to writing, all prior parol agreements are merged into -the instrument. When offered by the insurer
and accepted by the insured, the policy must be conclusively presumed
to contain all the terms by which the parties intended to be bound. 2 '
Where a party alleges mutual mistake or fraud, parol evidence is admissible to show the real agreement between the parties. 22 Either the
principal or the agent may be estopped by his representations or conduct from repudiating the transaction between the parties.2 3 Knowledge of the agent will be imputed to the insurer even if24a direct stipulation to the contrary appears in the policy or application.
The chief obstacle in reforming insurance contracts has been the fifth
reformation provision as set out in Malone's article. In the past, North
Carolina courts have refused reformation of insurance policies to meet
14.
5
16.
v. Life
.17.

Maxwell v. Wayne National Bank, 175 N.C. 180, 95 S.E. 147 (1918).
Clem....
ins. C.o. of Virginia, 155NC 57, 70 S.E. i076(i 9i).
Austin v. Life Insurance Co. of Va., 148 N.C. 24, 61 S.E. 614 (1908); Sykes
Insurance Co. of Va., 148 N.C. 13, 61 S.E. 610.
Briggs v. Life Insurance Co. of Va., 155 N.C. 73, 70 S.E. 1068 (1911).

18. Charleston & W.C. Ry. Co. v. Robert Lassiter & Co., 207 N.C. 408, 177 S.E.
9 (1934).
19. Dildy v. S.E. Fire Insurance Co., 13 N.C. App. 66, 185 S.E.2d 272 (1971).
20. Mayo v. American Fire & Casualty Co., 282 N.C. 346, 192 S.E.2d 828 (1972).
21. Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corp. v. Piedmont Ry. & Electric Co., 179 N.C.

402, 102 S.E. 636 (1920); Moore v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N.Y., 207 N.C. 433,
177 S.E. 406 (1934).

22. Word v. Ledbetter, 21 N.C. (1 Dev & B. Eq) 496 (1837); American Potato
Co. v. Jenette Bros., 172 N.C. 1, 89 S.E. 791 (1916).
23. Boney v. Central Mutual Insurance Co. of Chicago, 213 N.C. 563, 197 S.E.
122 (1938).

24. National Life Insurance Co. v. Grady, 185 N.C. 348, 117 S.E. 289 (1923).
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the reasonable expectations of the insured because the purchaser had
not read the policy promptly after receipt and brought any variances
between the oral representations and the written terms to the attention
of the insurer.2" Each case must be determined on its own merits, but
the following two cases seem to take notice of the fact that few people
ever read their insurance contracts.
In McCallum v. Insurance Company,2 6 an eighty year old woman
borrowed money from a bank which required her to purchase credit
life insurance. The woman did purchase the insurance, but the wrong
effective date and expiration date were typed on the policy which resulted in the repayment schedule not being covered by the insurance.
After the woman died, her executor brought an action for reformation
of the contract to have the policy cover the repayment schedule. The
contract was reformed by the court despite the "opportunity to read the
instrument rule" because of the mutual mistake of the parties and the
woman's old age. The court stated:
We have held in Bank of Union v. Redwine, 171 N.C. 559, 88 S.E.
878, and in Finishing and Warehouse Company v. Ozment, supra,
[132 N.C. 839, 44 S.E. 681] that a person's failure to read an instrument before signing it does not necessarily or always prevent refor27
mation.
In the second case, Gaston-Lincoln Transit v. Maryland Casualty
Company,18 a bus company always dealt with the same insurance agent
and had its insurance policy renewed with that company each year.
Each previous insurance contract had not limited coverage to a specific
radius around the garage. After instructions from the insurer, the
policy upon which the action was predicated was limited in coverage
to a certain radius around the central company operation. The bus
company was not aware of this provision until it filed a claim for damages sustained by a bus outside the radius of coverage. The bus company sued for reformation of the contract and was successful in the action. The court stated:
As 'is the rule with contracts generally, the mere failure of an insured
to read the policy does not necessarily prevent his seeking reforma29
tion thereon...
If the North Carolina courts are willing to embrace the reality that
people who purchase group credit life, accident and health, or property
25. Graham v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of N.Y., 176 N.C. 313, 97 S.E. 6 (1918);
McCallum v. Old Republic Life Insurance Co., 259 N.C. 573, 131 S.E.2d 435 (1963);
Setzer v. Old Republic Life Insurance Co., 257 N.C. 396, 126 S.E.2d 135 (1962); Baer,
Eleventh Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 42 N.C.L. REv. 600, 666.
26. 259 N.C. 573, 131 S.E.2d 435 (1963).
27. 259 N.C. at 581, 131 S.E.2d 440.
28. 20 N.C. App. 215, 201 S.E.2d 216 (1973).
29. Id. at 222, 201 S.E.2d at 220.
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insurance never see the master policy at the time of purchase and only
receive a copy of the terms many weeks after the transaction, then
it is possible that reformation of group credit insurance contracts for
fraud or mutual mistake may become a viable remedy for the consumer despite his failure to read the policy and bring any variances
between the oral representations and the written terms to the attention of the insurer. The consumer never deals with the insurer directly, but purchases the group credit insurance through an unlicensed
individual who apparently has the authority to enter into the agreement and who appears to be the agent of the insurer.
AGENCY REQUIREMENTS

In order to maintain an action for reformation of a group credit insurance policy to reflect the representations the salesman has given
to the consumer, the salesman must be an actual agent of the insurance company or be clothed with apparent authority to transact business for the insurance company. A creditor or salesman who performs services in placing the insured's group creditor insurance does
not become the agent of the insurer.8 0 North Carolina courts have
ruled that there is apparent authority for the consumer to believe that
the salesman or creditor is an agent of the insurer when printed forms
of the insurer are used in the application process."1 In group credit
insurance, the creditor or salesman uses his company's printed negotiable instrument forms which contain no reference to the insurer.
The lack of agency relationship between the insurer and the insured
is due to the fact that the insurance contract is between the insurer
and the creditor. 3" A group creditor's insurance contract is sold by
the insurance company to the creditor for the purpose of providing
various forms of creditor insurance service to their debtors. The insurance company contracts directly with the credit institution and
never knows the names of the debtors, or even if they pay their premiums. 33 The following case is directly on point.
In South Branch Valley National Bank v. Williams, 4 the bank made
30. Palmer v. Newport Trust Co., 245 A.2d 438 (Me. 1968); First National Bank
of Maiden v. Farmers New World Life Insurance Co., 455 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. 1970);
South Branch Valley National Bank v. Williams, 151 W. Va. 775, 155 S.E.2d 845
(1967).
31. Charleston & W.C. Ry. Co. v. Robert Lassiter & Co., 207 N.C. 408, 177 S.E.
9 (1934).
32. Palmer v. Newport Trust Co., 245 A.2d 438; First National Bank of Malden
v. Farmers New World Life Insurance Co., 455 S.W.2d 517; South Branch Valley National Bank v. Williams, 151 W. Va. 775, 155 S.E.2d 845.
33. Cases cited note 31 supra.
34. South Branch Valley National Bank v. Williams, 151 W. Va. 775, 155 S.E.2d

845 (1967).
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application for and obtained from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company a group creditors life insurance policy to insure the lives of their
debtors who purchased the protection. The insured debtor, John Williams, was sixty-five years old when he entered into the insurance
agreement with the bank. Without any knowledge of Mr. Williams'
insurance contract, Metropolitan Life directed the bank not to write
credit life insurance contracts for people over sixty-five. Despite the
notice, Mr. Ours, an employee of the bank, continued to collect premiums and send them to Metropolitan Life.
John Williams died and Metropolitan Life refused to pay the bank
the amount due on the note because Mr. Williams was over sixty-five
years old. The insurance company argued that; 1) the bank was not
an agent of its company; 2) that Mr. Ours, the bank representive, was
an agent of the bank; 3) that the insurance contract was solely between the insurance company and the bank; and 4) that the bank was
the policy holder and not the insured. The court ruled in favor of
the insurance company and stated:"5
We are not concerned here with the usual type of life insurance
policy. Ordinarily the person covered by a life insurance policy is -the
policyholder and the insured. He purchases the insurance from ,the
company, thereby creating privity of contract between him and the
insurer. At his death, his 'beneficiary is paid 'by the company. Such
is not the case in this instance. The record reveals a contract of
insurance between Metropolitan, the insurer, and South Branch Valley National Bank, the policyholder and the insured. There was no
contract between Metropolitan and John T. Williams. It necessarily
follows that Mr. Ours in no manner acted as an agent for the insurance company when he provided for coverage on the loan of John T.
Williams. This was a credit group life insurance policy, designed for
benefit of the bank. It served to stimulate its loan business by offering this coverage to its debtors and also offered the Bank protection against possible loss by reason of the death of a debtor.
The court also stated:36
It has been contended that Mr. Ours by collecting the premiums and
paying them to the insurer, became an agent of Metropolitan. The
procedure, as revealed by the record, was that the amount of the
premium was deducted by the Bank from each insured loan and at
the end of each month the total sum of all premiums so collected was
remitted to Metropolitan. The insurer had no knowledge of the
names of the debtors or who did or did not pay premiums to the
Bank. Its contract was with the Bank and not the debtors. This presented a mere matter of 'bookkeeping by Mr. Ours and was a service
performed on -behalfof the Bank.
35. Id. at 781, 155 S.E.2d at 851.
36. Id. at 782, 155 S.E.2d at 852.
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The court's ruling indicates that it holds the insured to be an incidental third party beneficiary to the insurance contract between the
insurance company and the creditor. The creditor's primary purpose,
in contracting for the insurance, was to ensure the repayment of debts
owed. Since the contract is not primarily for the benefit of the third
party debtor, and the creditor's primary intent in contracting is not
to discharge a duty owed to the debtor, the insured is not a creditor
beneficiary.1 7 If the creditor's primary purpose in contracting with
the insurance company had been to confer a gift upon the insured,
then -the insured would have been a donee beneficiary. Only a donee
or creditor beneficiary would have standing to sue the insurance company.3 8 Since the insured is only incidentally benefited by performance of the credit insurance contract, he cannot maintain an action
againt the insurer. 39 The courts of North Carolina have held that
there is no agency relationship between the purchaser of group credit
insurance policy and the insurance company.40
In Roger v. Prudential Insurance Company of America,4 ' plaintiff's
husband was employed by a construction company which had contracted for a group life insurance policy for its employees. The construction company did not pay the premiums for two consecutive months,
and the insurance policy was allowed to lapse. Despite this event, the
construction company continued to collect the premiums from the employees' checks. Plaintiffs husband died and Prudential refused to
pay the benefits. Plaintiff maintained that since her husband had
continued to pay the premiums the policy was still in force as to her
husband. The court ruled in favor of the insurance company because
the deduction of the employee's wages by the employer was not payment to the insurer. The court quoted Boseman v. Connecticut
General Life Insurance Company4 2 with approval:
When procuring the policy, obtaining application of employees, taking payment deduction orders, reporting changes in the insured group,
paying premiums and generally in doing whatever may serve tn obtai and keep the insurance in force, employers act43not as agents of
of insurer, but for their employees or for themselves.
37. Vogel v. Reed Supply Co., 277 N.C. 119, 177 S.E.2d 273 (1970); Crosrol Carding Developments, Inc. v. Gunter & Cooke Inc., 12 N.C. App. 448, 183 S.E.2d 834
(1971); Boone v. Boone, 217 N.C. 722, 9 S.E.2d 383 (1940); RESTATEMENT OF CON-

TRAcTs § 133 (1932).
38. Cases cited note 3 supra;
39. Cases cited note 3 supra;

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §

133 (1932).
133 (1932).

40. Newman v. Insurance Co., 255 N.C. 722, 122 S.E.2d 701 (1961); Haneline v.
Turner White Casket Co., 238 N.C. 127, 76 S.E.2d 372 (1953); Dewease v. Turner

White Insurance Co., 208 N.C. 732, 182 S.E. 447 (1935).
41. 259 N.C. 125, 130 S.E.2d 64 (1963).
42. 301 U.S. 196.

43. 259 N.C. at 127, 130 S.E.2d at 66.
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TRIAL BY JURY
Without an agency relationship on the part of the creditor or salesman
with the insurer, an action to reform the insurance contract to meet
the reasonable expectations of the insured as orally represented upon
application cannot be maintained.
CONCLUSION

Due to the present state of the law, the insurance companies are
completely insulated from any liability for misrepresentation caused
by the creditors and salesmen who service the consumer from their
group credit insurance policies. It is the responsibility of the North
Carolina Legislature to require the licensing of credit life, accident and
health, and property insurance agents so that they may be policed by
the insurance commissioner. The licensing of credit insurance agents
is the initial step in developing case law holdings of agency relationships between the insurance companies and creditor institutions which
purchase group credit insurance policies. If the courts were to find
such an agency relationship to exist without an act of the legislature
requiring the licensing of credit insurance agents, they would be writing social policy without an adequate basis in law.
WILLIAM

G.

REED

North Carolina General Statute Section 7A-2271 Denies
Litigant a Meaningful Right to Trial by Jury
One of our most sacred rights is the right to be judged by our peers.
Judicially, of course, this means the right to a trial by jury.
The right to a trial by jury is safeguarded by both the United States
and North Carolina Constitutions. Article I Section 25 of the North
Carolina Constitution provides: "In all controversies at law respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by jury is one of the best securities of the rights of the people, and shall remain sacred and inviolable." Actions for replevin and detinue have always been considered
actions at law in North Carolina.
The "Catch 22" of this right in North Carolina is the Magistrate's
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. 7A-227 (1967) provides that an appeal from judgment of a
magistrate does not stay execution. Execution may be stayed by order of the clerk of
superior court upon petition by the appellant accompanied by undertaking in writing executed by one or more sufficient sureties approved by the clerk to the effect that if judg-

ment be rendered against appellant the sureties will pay the amount thereof with costs
awarded against the appellant.
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